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Asymmetry and symmetry of acts and omissions in
punishment, norms, and judged causality
Toby Handﬁelda

John Thrasher†

Andrew Corcoran‡

Shaun Nichols§

Abstract
Harmful acts are punished more often and more harshly than harmful omissions.
This asymmetry has variously been ascribed to diﬀerences in how individuals perceive
the causal responsibility of acts versus omissions and to social norms that tend to
proscribe acts more frequently than omissions. This paper examines both of these
hypotheses, in conjunction with a new hypothesis: that acts are punished more than
omissions because it is usually more eﬃcient to do so. In typical settings, harms
occur as a result of relatively few harmful actions, but many individuals may have had
the opportunity to prevent or rectify the harm. Penalising actors therefore requires
relatively few punishment events compared to punishing omitters. We employ a novel
group paradigm in which harm occurs only if both actors and omitters contribute
to the harm. Subjects play a repeated economic game in ﬁxed groups involving a
social dilemma (total N = 580): on each round self-interest favours harmful actions
(taking from another) and harmful omissions (failing to repair the victim’s loss), but
the group payoﬀ is maximized if individuals refrain from these behaviors. In one
treatment harm occurs as a result of one action and two omissions; in the other, it
is the result of two actions and one omission. In the second treatment, the more
eﬃcient strategy to maximize group beneﬁt is to punish omissions. We ﬁnd that
subjects continue to prefer to punish acts rather than omissions, with two important
caveats. There is still a substantial level of punishment of omissions, and there is also
evidence of some responsiveness to the opportunity to enforce a more eﬃcient rule.
Further analysis addresses whether the omission eﬀect is associated with asymmetric
norm-based attitudes: a substantial proportion of subjects regard it as equally fair to
punish harmful acts and omissions, while another portion endorse an asymmetry; and
punishment behavior correlates with these attitudes in both groups.
Keywords: action, omission, act-omission, asymmetry, punishment, fairness
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1 Introduction
There are several ways in which actions are treated diﬀerently than omissions in general,
and in our moral psychology in particular (Baron & Ritov, 2004; Feldman, Kutscher &
Yay, 2020; Ritov & Baron, 1990). Doing harm tends to be judged more wrongful than
allowing harm to happen (e.g., Cushman, Young & Hauser, 2006). Actions that produce
bad outcomes are more likely to attract condemnation and punishment than omissions
that produce equally bad outcomes (Robinson & Darley, 1995; Spranca, Minsk & Baron,
1991). And if given a choice between harming through commission or omission, people
will typically choose omission (e.g., Asch et al., 1994; Meszaros et al., 1996). Of these
three asymmetries – in punishment, judgment, and choice – our focus in the present study
is the asymmetry of punishment, though there are likely to be close relationships between
all these phenomena.
There are three prominent explanations for the asymmetric moral status of acts versus
omissions, and all of them can be applied to the asymmetry of punishment in particular:
1. Causation. An action which leads to a particular outcome is judged to be in some
sense more causally responsible for that outcome than an omission that leads to the
same or an equivalent outcome – for instance actions can be physically connected to
outcomes in a way that omissions cannot (Dowe, 2004); and people prefer to punish
those whom they hold more causally responsible (see e.g., Baron & Ritov, 2009;
Cushman & Young, 2011; Greene et al., 2009; Jamison, Yay & Feldman, 2020;
Royzman & Baron, 2002; Spranca et al., 1991).
2. Intention. People judge harmful outcomes that come about via omission to be less
intentional than equivalently harmful actions (Hayashi, 2015), and prefer to punish
those who are judged to have manifestly harmful intentions (Cushman & Young,
2011; Jamison et al., 2020; but see Ritov & Baron, 1990; Royzman & Baron, 2002).
3. Social norms. Punishment is generally reserved for transgressions of injunctive norms
– lest it be considered sheer aggression – and societies tend to have a greater number of
injunctive norms proscribing actions than norms that proscribe omission (Willemsen
& Reuter, 2016; Willemsen & Kirfel, 2019; Robinson & Darley, 1995). Relatedly,
legal institutions tend to hold individuals criminally liable for harmful omissions
only in narrowly deﬁned circumstances, often requiring particular relationships to the
persons harmed (Ashworth, 2015; Kadish, Schulhofer & Barkow, 2016).
This research was supported by the Australian Research Council (DP170102834). We thank Jon Baron,
David Rojo Arjona, Chet Pager, Erik Kimbrough, Bart Wilson, and Vernon Smith for many helpful suggestions
and comments.
Preregistrations, data, and software for replication purposes, are available at https://osf.io/v6u3q.
Copyright: © 2021. The authors license this article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution
3.0 License.
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There is evidence that all three of these factors play some role in explaining the asymmetry.
Matters are further complicated in that there appears to be signiﬁcant interaction between
cognition of norms and of causation.
First, there is evidence that norm violations are more likely to be perceived as causes
than norm-conforming behaviors (Alicke, 1992; Knobe & Fraser, 2008; Kominsky, Phillips,
Gerstenberg, Lagnado & Knobe, 2015). For example, if two agents engage in physically
identical actions (taking pens from a cup) that are both causally necessary for the outcome
(the subsequent absence of pens), the agent who was breaking a rule in order to take the
pens is judged more causally responsible for the absence of pens. So if social norms tend to
prohibit actions more frequently than they prohibit omissions, actions will more typically be
norm transgressions, and this may explain why actions are typically judged more causally
responsible than omissions.
Second, causation by omission raises paradoxes about which omissions to count as
causes, given there will often be innumerably many candidates. (Some plants died because
no one watered them. Since no one watered them, everyone omitted to water them. Is
everyone’s failure to water them therefore a cause of their death?) There is evidence that
norms are involved in selecting particular omissions as causes – whereby again, normviolating behaviors are more liable to be regarded as causes (Henne, Pinillos & De Brigard,
2017). Suppose Bob’s failure to water the plants broke his promise to water them, whereas
your failure did not: people appear to judge Bob’s omission more causal because it violated
a norm of promise keeping.
Both these considerations suggest that the explanation in terms of norms may be a
common cause of both causal perception and an omission eﬀect in punishment. But there
are several limitations of extant work on norms and the omission bias1, and we designed
our experiments to try to meet some of these limitations. First, rather than using vignette
studies, we explore whether the omission bias will emerge in punishment behavior in an
economic experiment with real monetary incentives. We use monetary incentives because
real punishment decisions involve substantial risks and costs (Boehm, 1999; Nikiforakis,
2008; Wiessner, 2005).
A second feature of our studies is that subjects simultaneously judge whether to punish
both actors and omitters. In typical psychological experiments on the punishment asymmetry, subjects read vignettes describing harmful behavior by one individual (an action or
omission) and are asked to report the degree to which they believe the individual should be
punished. These vignettes typically frame the bad outcome as the result of only one person’s
behavior, but this is a substantial simpliﬁcation. There are always many causal factors in
the past of a given event, so there will always be concerns that, in changing a scenario so
as to manipulate whether an act or omission is the alleged sole cause of the harm, we may
have introduced other assumptions about the causal history of the event that are morally
1We use the term “bias” simply to denote an asymmetry in the treatment of harmful acts versus omissions.
We do not intend to imply any normative judgment as to whether this asymmetry is justiﬁed or not.
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relevant (Asscher, 2007). We therefore study settings in which there are multiple potential
transgressors: some who harm by commission, some who harm by omission, to see if there
is an asymmetry in preference to punish across these individuals. Rather than looking for
diﬀerent patterns of blame across two diﬀerent scenarios, we can look at patterns within a
single scenario, to get a tightly controlled test.
A third feature of our experiment requires a bit more explanation. Our studies examined
an economic consideration that may contribute to explaining the punishment asymmetry:
the relative efficiency of punishing acts versus omissions. In typical circumstances, it will
often be less costly to enforce a rule that proscribes harmful actions than to enforce either a
rule that proscribes harmful omissions, or a rule that proscribes both. Consider an example
of a community that wishes to preserve a pristine beach environment. If a small amount
of litter is left on the beach, this is likely to be the result of just one action (dropping some
litter), and also the result of several omissions (every person who was near the beach at the
time could have picked it up). Punishment could be used to reduce the frequency of this
outcome in diﬀerent ways. The bad outcome could be prevented by threatening to punish:
• those who drop litter (i.e., enforcing a rule that proscribes actions),
• those who fail to pick up litter (enforcing a rule that proscribes omissions), or
• those who do either of the above (enforcing a rule that demands certain outcomes be
achieved)
Provided rates of enforcement are high enough, any one of these policies would suﬃce to
ensure the beach remains pristine. But it is very likely that the cost of administering the
second and third policies will be much greater than the cost of administering the ﬁrst, simply
because there will usually be multiple individuals who could have picked up the litter, but
relatively few who dropped the litter.2
It should be noted that we focus on injunctive norms, i.e., norms that proscribe or
prescribe certain actions (e.g., a norm against littering or a norm for paying taxes), as a
possible determinant of the omission bias. Earlier work on perception of causes has found
omissions are more likely to be judged causal if they violate either injunctive norms or
descriptive norms – if they are immoral or abnormal (Hitchcock & Knobe, 2009; Knobe &
Fraser, 2008; McGrath, 2005). Because we are focusing on punishment, however, we take
it to be implausible that subjects will judge omissions as more deserving of punishment
simply on account of their rarity (though see Eriksson et al., 2015 for evidence suggesting
that subjects may conﬂate the two types of norm). Consequently, we assume that, if an
2Even if there were perfect compliance with a rule proscribing failure to pick up rubbish – in which case
there would be no associated punishment costs – if the beneﬁt to those who litter is of lesser magnitude than
the inconvenience to those who remove it, then this arrangement will be less eﬃcient than one in which there
is perfect compliance with a prohibition on dropping litter. This is a second reason that a rule proscribing
actions will tend to be more eﬃcient. In our experimental setting we make the beneﬁt of the harmful action
exactly equal to the cost of preventing the harm, thus removing this possible basis for preferring to enforce an
action rule.
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asymmetry of norms explains the asymmetry of punishment of acts and omissions, it is an
asymmetry of injunctive norms.
Two ﬁnal methodological features of our studies are worth noting. First, punishment
decisions are made collectively, by the victim and an unaﬀected bystander; and second,
behavior is observed in a repeated game with ﬁxed groups. We use a repeated game with
ﬁxed groups in order to give subjects the opportunity to learn about the social preferences
of their groupmates, because social norms are very likely to be a signiﬁcant factor in any
explanation of punishment behavior in these settings (Ramalingam, Morales & Walker,
2019). We use collective punishment decisions for two reasons: there is evidence that it is
important that punishment be perceived as legitimate if it is to reliably promote cooperation
(Herrmann, Thöni & Gächter, 2008; Sylwester, Mitchell, Lowe, & Bryson, n.d.) and
punishment decisions that are made collectively, especially if they involve an unaﬀected
third party, are more likely to be perceived as justiﬁed. And secondly, several models suggest
coordination of punishment may be especially conducive to the evolution of cooperative
behavior (Boyd, Gintis & Bowles, 2010; Gavrilets, 2012; Hilbe et al., 2014).
To the best of our knowledge, no previous studies of the act–omission asymmetry have
had this combination of features. While recent studies have demonstrated the act–omission
asymmetry in punishment behavior with monetary incentives (Cox, Servátka & Vadovič,
2017; Ramalingam et al., 2019), they have not used collective punishment. Punishment
involving an impartial spectator has been examined in social dilemmas (Croson & Konow,
2009; Tan & Xiao, 2012), but not in an environment where there is a meaningful act–
omission distinction. One ﬁnding from the existing literature on collective punishment is
that it can lead to suboptimal levels of punishment (Tan & Xiao, 2012): because impartial
spectators are less likely to punish, they may not punish with enough frequency to deter free
riders. This entails our design is likely to be a particularly stringent test for the existence
of an act–omission asymmetry in punishment, which may be more evident if punishment
were decided by individuals with a direct interest.
A primary aim of our studies is to evaluate the norm-based account of the omission
eﬀect regarding punishment. That account predicts that we will ﬁnd an omission bias
only if there is an asymmetry in the normative judgments about the propriety of punishing
actors versus omitters. Humans may instead possess a heuristic of punishing actions rather
than omissions, regardless of their causal or normative judgments, because this heuristic is
computationally cheap and will be adaptive in the majority of naturally occurring scenarios
(Baron & Ritov, 2004; Gigerenzer, 2008). A further corollary of the norms view is that
individuals who regard punishing omitters and punishing actors as morally equivalent, will
punish both to similar degrees.
To anticipate, we ﬁnd a substantial minority of subjects demonstrate an omission eﬀect,
preferring to punish those who harm by their actions, and this ﬁnding remains robust across
diﬀerences in the eﬃciency of punishment. In keeping with the norm theory, the omission
bias we ﬁnd is associated with asymmetric judgments about the fairness of punishing actors
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and omitters. Although there is some omission eﬀect – i.e., people are more likely to punish
actors than omitters – a substantial proportion of subjects also punish both. Consonant
with the norm-based view, this behavior is most pronounced in subjects who judge that it
is equally fair to punish actors and omitters. We also ﬁnd some modest evidence for our
hypothesized preference to punish in a relatively eﬃcient manner: a preference to punish
actions when relatively few actors contribute to the harm, and to punish omitters when
relatively few omitters contribute to the harm. But the magnitude of this eﬀect is notably
smaller than the magnitude of the average preference to punish actors rather than omitters.
Below we present our main experiment and a follow up. In addition to these experiments,
we report two preliminary experiments, which obtained similar ﬁndings, in the Supplement,
which also describes all preregistered hypotheses, and any deviations from those hypotheses.

2 Study 1
2.1 Methods
We recruited 210 subjects (mean age 22.0 years, sd = 3.7) from the Monash Laboratory for
Experimental Economics subject pool to participate in a laboratory experiment involving
an economic game. Subjects from our preliminary studies (see Supplement) were excluded.
Subjects were randomly assigned to 42 groups of 5 to engage in an economic task with a
structure that might be described as an asymmetric public goods game: individuals have
the opportunity to engage in behavior that is personally costly but beneﬁcial to the group, or
to engage in personally beneﬁcial behavior at cost to the group (Ledyard, 1997). (Our task
is asymmetric because, unlike in a standard public goods game, on each round only some
subjects have the opportunity to make selﬁsh/altruistic decisions – though over the course of
the experiment, all subjects have equal expectations of opportunities to cooperate/defect.)
Interactions were anonymous, via computer software, implemented using oTree (Chen,
Schonger & Wickens, 2016). Subjects were paid in private at the end of the session. All
the experimental procedures were common knowledge to the subjects, and there was no
deception.
We had two treatments, diﬀering in the causal roles of acts and omissions in sustaining
the public good. Subjects undertook both treatments, in random order. In both treatments,
subjects are randomly placed into groups of 5 players to play a repeated game over 12 or 15
rounds.3
2.1.1

2O treatment (“Two omissions”)

First, all players in each group are assigned an initial endowment of 180, 200, or 220 experimental currency units (ECU), with each endowment chosen independently, at random.
3In some early lab sessions, we conducted the game over 15 rounds, but found that this took too long to
complete the experiment in the advertised time. All rounds are included in our analysis below.
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(Each ECU was worth AUD0.12, which at the time was worth approximately USD0.09.)
The randomization of initial endowments introduces some initial inequalities between individuals, generating more heterogeneous conditions across the experiment, and avoiding
any strong implication of strict equality as a normative standard.
Second, players are randomly assigned to various roles for the given round: 1 x Red
button presser, 2 x Green button pressers, 1 x Button-aﬀected individual, and 1 x Unaﬀected
individual. These were the terms used in all instructions to the subjects. For ease of
exposition, however, we henceforth refer to the button-aﬀected individual as the “victim”
and the unaﬀected individual as the “bystander”.
The Red button presser is an individual who can choose to press a red button, for a
gain of 40 ECU. Pressing the button, however, will cause the victim to lose 120 ECU. The
Green button pressers can then choose whether or not to press their buttons, which will
have the eﬀect of undoing the harm to the victim. If a green button is pressed, the victim
will have his/her initial endowment restored, but the green button pressers lose 40 ECU (if
both press, the cost is shared, if only one presses, the cost is borne by the sole presser); no
change occurs to the red presser when green is pressed. See Figure 1 for an overview of
these stages of the task.
Endowments unaffected

No

Affected individual has 120 restored
Green pressers lose 40 (aggregate)
Press
Red?
Green
button 1
pressed?

Yes

One or both presses
Green

Red presser gains 40
Affected individual
loses 120
Green
button 2
pressed?

Neither presses

No further change to endowments

Figure 1: Overview of initial stages of 2O (Two omissions) treatment. Note that green button
pressing decisions are made simultaneously, so in deciding to press green, an individual
does not know whether they will have to shoulder the entire burden of restoring victim, or if
it will be shared.
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Both pressing the red button, and refraining from pressing a green button, are harmful,
in the sense that they not only have negative consequences for the victim but the aggregate
payoﬀ to the group is also lower by 80 ECU. Because the game is repeated, and roles are
randomly allocated each round, the diachronic extended game resembles a public goods
problem. The aggregate group payoﬀ is maximized either if the red button is never pressed,
or if, whenever the red button is pressed, at least one of the green buttons is also pressed.
The ﬁrst of these possibilities requires the red button pressers to forgo an opportunity for
personal gain, while the second requires the green button pressers to suﬀer a loss. If the
group can enforce a norm of refraining from pressing the red button and/or always pressing
green buttons, the public good will be preserved, to the expected beneﬁt of all over the
entire game.4
After decisions on button pressing are made, a punishment stage occurs. If the red
button was pressed, the bystander is given the option to propose (costly) punishment of
behaviors that contributed to the harm. The bystander is asked, e.g., “How many ECU do
you wish to deduct from the red button presser?” and “How many ECU do you wish to deduct
from each of the green button non-pressers (if any)?” By answering these questions, the
bystander nominates punishment levels separately for both red pressers (harmful actors) and,
if relevant, for green refusers (harmful omitters). The victim is informed of the proposed
punishment levels and can choose to accept or reject the proposal. If it is accepted, the
punishment is enacted, otherwise it has no eﬀect. Punishment jointly costs the punishers
1 ECU per 3 ECU to be deducted from the punished party. If for instance the bystander
nominates 9 ECU be deducted from each green omitter, and 6 ECU be deducted from the
red presser, this will have the eﬀect of reducing the relevant endowments by those amounts,
but will also cost ((9 x 2) + 6)/3 = 12 ECU, and this cost is divided equally between the
bystander and the victim. The maximum amount that can be deducted from an individual
is 30 ECU.
Although punishment is a net destructive activity, if it sustains a norm of not pressing
red, or always pressing green, it may be to the group’s overall beneﬁt to punish, especially
on earlier rounds (Gächter, Renner, & Sefton, 2008). Subjects receive full feedback on
all decisions made in their group at the end of each round. Because we randomly shuﬄe
identiﬁers between rounds, there is little danger to punishers that they will suﬀer retaliation
on subsequent rounds, thus maximizing the potentially prosocial motivation for punishment.
4This game thus contains elements resembling “take-some” public goods games in the sense that the red
button pushers can take additional resources, reducing the group’s aggregate payoﬀ; and elements resembling
the opposite, “give-some” framing in that the green button pushers can forgo resources, thereby increase the
group’s aggregate payoﬀ (Ledyard, 1997; Fehr & Gächter, 2000; Chaudhuri, 2011). In simple, two-person
games it is common to see more cooperative, prosocial behavior in take-some framings, rather than in givesome framings (van Dĳk & Wilke, 2000). These framing diﬀerences, however, have not been observed in
more complex, multi-player games (Haesevoets, Hiel, Assche, Folmer & Bostyn, 2019). Further, if framing
of this sort was important in our game, we should expect to see relatively more selﬁsh behavior by green
button subjects than red, but, as we report below, we ﬁnd the opposite.
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2A treatment (“Two actions”)

In the 2O treatment, harm occurs only if one action and two omissions are performed, hence
we refer to that treatment as “Two omissions”: 2O. Our other treatment involves reversing
the causal structure, such that two actions and one omission is necessary for harm to occur,
hence the treatment is referred to as “Two actions”: 2A. Otherwise, the games are the same.
See Figure 2 for a comparison.

2O

a

b

Not
Pressed

Not
pressed

No harm

Pressed

d

Not
pressed

f
Pressed

No harm

Harm

Not
pressed

e
Pressed

Not
pressed

Not
Pressed

No harm

Not
pressed

Pressed

2A

c
Not
pressed

Pressed

Pressed

Pressed

Pressed

No harm

Pressed

Harm

Not
pressed

Figure 2: The parallel causal structures of the two treatments. Normal arrowheads indicate causal promotion, circular heads indicate prevention. Nodes shaded grey indicate
non-occurrence of the relevant event. In 2O, one omission is insufficient for harm (a), and
correspondingly, in 2A, one action is insufficient for harm (d). In 2O, two omissions won’t
cause harm, provided no action occurs (b); and correspondingly in 2A, two actions won’t
cause harm, provided no omission occurs (e); finally, in 2O, two omissions cause harm,
when a harmful action also occurs (c); and in 2A, two actions cause harm, when a harmful
omission occurs also (f).

Our principal measure of interest is the amount of punishment proposed on rounds
where the harm eventuates: where all available red buttons are pressed and no one presses
a green button. On such rounds, there are three potential targets for punishment, and we
separately record the bystander’s proposed punishment for actors and for omitters.
Our design therefore addresses the possible interaction of two variables in determining
amounts of punishment (i) whether the relevant subject performed an action or omission
that was causally relevant, and (ii) whether the action or omission is the only event (solely
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responsible) of that type required for the harmful outcome or if multiple events of that type
were required (jointly responsible).
Because our principal measure is the amount of punishment proposed on a round where
harm actually occurs, there was the possibility of obtaining insuﬃcient data if harm did not
often occur. As a precaution against this, on one round we collected subject responses using
the “strategy method” (Selten, 1967). The relevant round was chosen at random in each lab
session (to control for any order eﬀects). The strategy method involves subjects indicating
their choices hypothetically, for all possible contingencies, in advance of knowing which
role they have been allocated to or what choices other subjects will make. These choices
are then combined with allocation to roles to determine an outcome to the round, using the
same payoﬀ structure as in normal rounds. Observations from this round are excluded from
our principal measure, but are consistent with our main results (see Supplement).
After the punishment decisions were made, subjects were asked to judge the propriety
of punishing actors and omitters in the most recent treatment they completed. In particular,
subjects were asked to answer the following questions on a scale of 1 (not at all fair) to 7
(completely fair):
To what extent do you think it would be fair to be punished for pushing the Red
button?
To what extent do you think it would be fair to be punished for not pushing the
Green button?
Subjects also completed a demographic survey. Subjects earned a fee of AUD10 for
participation, plus their earnings from one round of the experiment, chosen at random.
(Payment for a single randomly chosen round avoids any wealth eﬀects that are liable to
occur if earnings aggregate throughout the experiment.) Average earnings were AUD34.38
(approximately USD27), sd = 7.44.

2.2 Results
Both harmful actions and harmful omissions were relatively frequent, with the average
subject pressing red on 68% of opportunities and refusing to press green on 61% of
opportunities.
Across all experimental sessions, there were 296 rounds in which the group had an
opportunity to punish those who contributed to a harmful outcome. We examine both the
frequency with which punishment is proposed and the amount of punishment proposed.
Punishment was proposed by the bystander on 160 of those rounds (54%). The distribution
of these punishment proposals is summarized in Table 1 below. In both treatments, a
large proportion of respondents proposed to punish both actions and omissions. Some
degree of omission eﬀect appears evident, however, in that there are more occasions when
actions alone are punished than omissions alone. Across treatments, the distribution of
805
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punishment proposals is relatively similar, suggesting little or no eﬀect of our causal structure
manipulation, at the level of punishment frequency.5
Table 1: Summary distribution of punishment proposals made across the two treatments.
To control for repeated observations across groups, we use a Cochran-Mantel-Haenszel ChiSquared test, with continuity correction. The test does not quite reject the null hypothesis that
the probability of punishing acts and omissions is the same in the 2A treatment ( 𝜒 2 (1)=3.54,
p=0.060, 95% CI for the odds ratio 1.08, 19.33), but rejects that null hypothesis in the 2O
treatment ( 𝜒 2 (1)=18.52, p<0.001, 95% CI for the odds ratio 4.46, 839.21). Evidently both
conditions show a very similar pattern.

Treatment
2A (n = 163)
2O (n = 106)

Punish actions only Punish omissions only Punish both Punish neither
11%
15%

5%
5%

36%
35%

48%
45%

Examining the amounts of punishment proposed for acts versus omissions, we observed
a consistent pattern whereby actions were punished more harshly than omissions, and solely
responsible harmful behaviors are punished more than jointly responsible behaviors. We
calculate the asymmetry in punishment towards acts by subtracting each group’s average
proposed punishment of omissions from its average proposed punishment of actions. In 2A,
32 of 37 groups had positive bias towards punishing actions; in 2O, 27 of 35 groups were
biased towards punishing actions. Table 2 presents the mean punishment levels proposed
for each harmful behavior type (note that because these means include cases where zero
punishment was proposed for both actors and omitters, it arguably underestimates the degree
of act–omission asymmetry).
Table 2: Summary distribution of mean punishment levels proposed for jointly/solely responsible acts and omissions, conditional on any punishment being proposed.
Actions
Jointly responsible 6.95 (sd = 2.94, n = 83)
Solely responsible 7.94 (sd = 3.08, n = 64)

Omissions
6.10 (sd = 3.62, n = 49)
6.44 (sd = 3.50, n = 72)

Although there was a clear pattern of preference to punish actions more harshly, we
were struck by the relatively high proportion of our subjects who were willing to punish
omissions. Across the 2A and 2O treatments, there were 179 subjects who had at least one
opportunity to propose punishments of both actors and omitters. Some form of punishment
was proposed by 110 of those subjects (61%). Of those subjects, 86 proposed punishing
5Because punishment will not be enacted without the approval of the victim, we focus on punishment
proposed as a more informative measure of punishment intentions. For completeness, in the supplement, we
also describe the distribution of actual punishment dispensed, which is broadly similar.
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omitters at least once. In other words, 48% of all subjects who had the chance to punish, and
78% of subjects who ever actually proposed punishment, on at least one occasion suggested
that some punishment should be inﬂicted on omitters. These ﬁgures were much higher
than our prior expectations. (See Table S4 in the Supplement for further details, including
conﬁdence intervals.)
2.2.1

Fairness

We turn now to the descriptive results on the judgments of fairness. Figure 3 summarizes
the results from the survey in which we asked subjects about their perception of the fairness
of punishing harmful acts and omissions. We assume subjects will regard it as fair to
punish a behavior if and only if that behavior is proscribed by social norms. Accordingly,
these responses give us some indication of whether there is an asymmetry in (injunctive)
normative attitudes to harmful omissions and actions in this setting.
Evidently, it is less controversial whether it is fair to punish a harmful action, whereas
there is signiﬁcant disagreement about the fairness of punishing a harmful omission. A
within-subjects test conﬁrms that the answers to these questions are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
at the group level (z = 3.881, p = 0.0001, Wilcoxon sign-rank test).
We then examined within subjects the diﬀerence between their answers to these two
questions (Figure 4). A positive score indicates they agreed more with the fairness of
punishing a harmful action than punishing a harmful omission, zero indicates that they
regarded both as equally fair (or equally unfair), and a negative score indicates they regarded
it as more fair to punish harmful omissions.
Only 19% of subjects rate it as more fair to punish omissions than actions. 30% rate
the two as equally fair, and the remaining 51% of subjects rate it as more fair to punish
actions than omissions. Comparing these results at the group level across the two possible
treatment orders suggests no signiﬁcant diﬀerence (z = 0.556, p = 0.578, Wilcoxon test).
2.2.2

Correlating asymmetries of punishment and fairness judgments

To initially assess the association of fairness judgments and punishment behavior, we
generate a variable Punishment bias which is, for each round, the amount of punishment
proposed for harmful actions divided by the total amount of punishment proposed for acts
and omissions, less one half (thus omitting cases in which no punishment is proposed).
This variable thus ranges from –0.5 for a subject who punishes only omissions, to +0.5 for
a subject who punishes only actions, and is zero whenever acts and omissions are punished
equally. Taking the group averages of punishment bias and fairness asymmetry, we observe
there is a signiﬁcant correlation between them (Kendall’s tau = 0.30, p = 0.037): suggesting
that the asymmetry of punishment is associated with asymmetric fairness judgments.6
6An alternative measure of punishment asymmetry, which includes cases of zero proposed punishment, is
to subtract punishment of omissions from punishment of actions. Conducting a similar correlation test with
fairness attitudes, using this measure, we obtain a Kendall’s tau of 0.27, p = 0.062.
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Figure 3: Histograms of individual answers to question asking about perceived fairness of
punishing an agent for a harmful act (pressing red, left figure) or omission (failing to press
green, right figure), by treatment (solid grey bars 2A, hollow red bars 2O). Answers relate to
a 7-item Likert scale, ranging from “Completely fair” to “Not at all fair”.
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Figure 4: Histogram of individual differences in perceived fairness of punishing an action
versus punishing an omission. Responses range from –6 (maximally more fair to punish
omissions) to +6 (maximally more fair to punish actions).

We further interrogate this data in a series of linear mixed-eﬀects regression models to
predict the amount of punishment proposed, presented in Table 3. The principal independent
variables used in the various models are: act/omission, an indicator variable for whether the
targeted behavior is an action (pressing a red button) or an omission (refraining from pressing
green); jointly responsible, an indicator for whether the behavior type (act/omission) is one
of two instances that contributed to the harm. So in the 2A treatment, for instance, actions
are jointly responsible and omissions are not jointly responsible, and vice versa in the 2O
treatment; treatment order is a dummy for the sequence in which the subject engaged in each
treatment; Asymmetry of fairness judgments is a standardized continuous variable, reporting
the diﬀerence between the subject’s reported judgment of the fairness of punishing harmful
acts and punishing harmful omissions.
Model (1) ﬁnds both the act–omission distinction and joint-versus-sole responsibility
predict punishment levels, with actions being punished more and jointly responsible contributions being punished less. In other words, the model estimates that on average, solely
responsible actions will attract the most punishment, and jointly responsible omissions will
attract the least. The diﬀerence between these extreme cases is approximately 1.7 ECU in
punishment expenditure, which has three times that magnitude diﬀerence in terms of eﬀect
on those punished. Model (2) adds additional covariates for gender of subjects and number
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of experiments completed in the past, and ﬁnds similar results. Model (3) tests for a possible
interaction between act/omission and joint responsibility, and does not ﬁnd one.
Table 3: Regression models for punishment level proposed by bystander. Standard errors
in parentheses. A coefficient of 1 means that an increment of the associated variable predicts
an additional 1 ECU expenditure on punishment (which has an effect of 3 extra ECU being
deducted from the punished party). All models include random effects for individual and
continuous, fixed effects for round, coefficients not shown here. Additional covariates are for
gender and number of experiments done in the past. Dummy variables other than gender
are mean centered. Note that N is lower for some models because not all subjects completed
the post-experiment survey items in the allotted time for the lab session.

(1)
1.139∗∗∗
(0.251)
Jointly responsible (not solely) −0.541∗
(0.251)
Treatment order
0.764
(0.556)
Action * Jointly responsible
Action (not omission)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

1.070∗∗∗
(0.256)
−0.625∗
(0.256)
0.752
(0.543)

1.139∗∗∗
(0.253)
−0.541∗
(0.253)
0.820
(0.532)
0.222
(0.687)

1.097∗∗∗
(0.269)
−0.649∗
(0.269)
0.568
(0.576)

1.065∗∗∗
(0.268)
−0.620∗
(0.268)
0.567
(0.576)

1.065∗∗∗
(0.268)
−0.620∗
(0.268)
0.461
(0.571)

−0.068
(0.280)

0.068
(0.280)
0.519∗
(0.260)

0.029
(0.279)
0.519∗
(0.260)

Asymmetry of fairness judgments
Action * Asymmetry of fairness judgments
Additional covariates

No

Yes

No

No

No

Yes

N

538

522

538

492

492

492

∗

p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Model (4) includes subjects’ opinions about the fairness of punishing those who commit
harmful actions versus harmful omissions. Normative asymmetry is positive when a subject
rated it more fair to punish acts than omissions, and zero if they regard these punishment
options equally fair. This variable is not itself a signiﬁcant predictor of punishment levels,
but the interaction of this variable with action/omission is signiﬁcant (models (5) and (6)).
Figure 5 illustrates the interaction: the act–omission distinction only makes a diﬀerence for
subjects who have an asymmetry in their fairness attitudes towards punishment of acts and
omissions.
This result suggests that it is primarily subjects holding this asymmetric normative
attitude who punish acts more than omissions. For instance, model (6) estimates that, other
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Figure 5: Interaction plot of normative judgment asymmetry and act/omission, with 95%
confidence intervals, derived from model (6). Note that because the normative judgment
asymmetry variable has been standardized for the purposes of mean-centering, zero on the
horizontal axis does not mean a perfectly symmetrical attitude toward acts and omissions.
The strictly symmetrical attitude is indicated with a dashed vertical line.

things being equal, an individual who has the maximally asymmetric attitude will spend
2.6 ECU more to punish an action than an omission, whereas an individual who has a
symmetric attitude will spend only 0.6 ECU more on punishing actions than omissions.
More generally, we observe that the act–omission distinction, or its interaction with
fairness, is a signiﬁcant predictor in all models. We also observe that there is a tendency
for subjects to spend approximately 0.6 ECU less on the punishment of jointly responsible
individuals. This suggests some individuals may be adjusting their punishment to align
with the more eﬃcient punishment strategy (which is to forgo punishing jointly responsible
individuals), but it is a relatively modest eﬀect: about half the magnitude of the predicted
increase in punishment for actions versus omissions in general.
The regression models reported above suggest that asymmetric judgments of fairness
of punishing acts and omissions predict asymmetric punishment behavior. We cannot be
conﬁdent about the causal direction – for instance, fairness judgments might be post hoc
rationalizations of earlier behavior. However, this ﬁnding does conform to the predictions
of the norms account.
As a robustness check, we performed similar regressions, including groups who failed
our pre-registered comprehension criterion. The results were broadly similar. See the
Supplement.
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2.3 Discussion
Our ﬁrst study conﬁrmed that there is a robust act–omission distinction in the novel setting
of our experiment, where punishment involved substantial personal cost for both punisher
and punished. It also showed that, on average, subjects will be biased in their punishment
decisions to punish acts more than omissions, even when the structure of the task is such
that it is more cost-eﬀective to punish harmful omissions.
Notwithstanding that we found a substantial act–omission distinction on average, we also
found that a substantial portion of our subjects punished both acts and omissions equally.
This is in line with earlier work on the omission eﬀect with regard to choice and blame,
which found substantial individual diﬀerences (Spranca et al., 1991). On closer analysis,
this study suggests that the variation is associated with a diﬀerence in fairness attitudes
towards the punishment of actions and omissions. A substantial proportion of our subjects
thought it equally fair to punish a harmful actor or omitter, and this attitude was highly
predictive of punishment behavior. Though we cannot, with the present design, establish
whether these attitudes are causally upstream or downstream of the punishment asymmetry,
the ﬁnding ﬁts well with a norm-based explanation of the punishment asymmetry. To more
directly compare this explanation to a major competitor – a causal account – in the next study
we added survey questions assessing the subjects’ perceptions of the causal contributions
of actions and omissions to the overall outcome.

3 Study 2
3.1 Methods
In the previous study, we used an asymmetric structure where harm eventuated when two
agents performed harmful acts/omissions, and only one agent performed the opposite type of
behavior. Because of this, agents proposing punishment always faced twice the marginal cost
to punish one type of behavior or another. Although this asymmetry was counterbalanced
across the treatments, we decided to conduct a second study with a symmetrical structure, to
enable a more direct comparison of willingness to punish acts versus omissions in a single
round.
In Study 2, we therefore generalized the structure of our previous treatments to use a
paradigm where multiple actions and multiple omissions are required for harm to eventuate.
We refer to this as the 2A2O (“two act, two omission”) treatment. In this setting, there are
six subjects in each group: two red button pressers, two green button pressers, a “victim”
and a “bystander”. Both of the red buttons must be pressed, and neither of two green buttons
must be pressed, for harm to eventuate to the victim. As in the previous study, the beneﬁt of
pressing red (+40) is ﬁxed and will be shared evenly if both buttons are pressed. Similarly,
the cost of pressing green (–40) is ﬁxed and will be shared evenly if both green buttons
are pressed. As in the previous study, punishment decisions are proposed by the bystander,
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and must be approved by the victim in order to be enacted. Punishment costs the punishers
1 ECU to inﬂict 3 ECU loss on a punished party. The costs of any punishment imposed are
shared equally between the two punishers. The maximum punishment that can be inﬂicted
is 30 ECU per subject.
(The opportunity to punish potentially harmful behaviors is provided on rounds where
no harm occurs – if, for instance, one or more red buttons is pressed and one or more green
buttons is pressed. Our main analyses concern only punishment decisions where harm did
occur, and thus could be ascribed to either red button pressing or omission to press a green
button – but for completeness we also describe punishment data from no-harm events in the
supplement.)
In addition to this structural change, we added two survey questions asking subjects to
evaluate the causal inﬂuence of the relevant acts and omissions on the eventual outcome
(see Box). By including these responses in our regression models, we could estimate the
degree to which an asymmetry in perceptions of causal responsibility might explain the
preference to punish acts more than omissions.
Box. Wording of questions regarding causal influence of acts and omissions on
eventual harm.
Earlier in this experiment, you participated in one task in which there were two
people who had the opportunity to press a red button and two people who had the
opportunity to press a green button.
Imagine a scenario in which both red buttons were pressed by participants C and
B, and both green buttons were not pressed by participants A and E. As a result,
participant D – the button-aﬀected participant – lost 120 ECU.
Indicate your agreement with the following:
• Participant C’s pressing Red was one of the causes of the button-aﬀected
participant losing 120 ECU.
(7 point Likert scale ranging from 1 = Strongly disagree to 7 = Strongly agree.)
• Participant A’s not pressing Green was one of the causes of the button-aﬀected
participant losing 120 ECU.
(7 point Likert scale ranging from 1 = Strongly disagree to 7 = Strongly agree.)
We conducted this experiment with 138 subjects in 23 groups of 6 (mean age 22.7
years, sd = 3.4) recruited from the same source as our earlier studies. As before, subjects
interacted anonymously via software implemented using oTree, and were paid in cash, in
private at the end of each session. Average earnings were AUD34.21, sd = 4.58. Subjects
from our earlier experiments were excluded from participating.
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3.2 Results
Consistent with Study 1, we observed that acts are more likely to be punished than omissions
(Table 4), and gross expenditure on punishment of acts exceeds that on punishment of
omissions. In all 23 groups, the average proposed punishment of harmful actions (mean
4.17, SD = 2.28) was greater than the average proposed punishment of harmful omissions
(mean 1.17, SD = 1.07). Also consistent with Study 1, we observed high rates of punishing
omitters. On 48% of rounds where punishment was possible, it was proposed that omitters
receive some punishment. Conditional on any punishment being proposed at all, 22/33
punishment proposals included punishment of omitters.
Table 4: Contingency table of punishment proposal types, where both actors and omitters
are jointly responsible. A Cochran-Mantel-Haenszel Chi-Squared test rejects the null hypothesis that the probabilities of punishing acts and omissions are the same (chi(1) = 4.88,
p = 0.02721).

Punish omissions Don’t punish omissions
Punish actions
Don’t punish actions

3.2.1

33%
5%

28%
34%

Causal judgments

Mean agreement with the proposition that pressing red was a cause of a subject being
harmed was 5.3 on a 7-point Likert scale (sd = 1.67, 95% CI 5.02–5.59). For the equivalent
proposition that failure to press green was a cause of harm, mean agreement was 4.4 (sd
= 1.97, 95% CI 4.09–4.75). Figure 6 summarises the distribution of the within-subject
diﬀerences on these items. The mean diﬀerence is 0.88 (sd = 2.39, 95% CI 0.48–1.29).
We attempted to assess whether causal judgment asymmetry might explain a preference
to punish actions, by conducting individual level correlations of individual bias in punishment proposals (individual average proposed amounts to punish harmful actions, less
proposed punishments of harmful omissions) with both causal judgment asymmetry and
normative judgment asymmetry (Table 5). With only 23 groups, however, this study was
insuﬃciently powered to detect any association.7

3.3 Discussion
Study 2 conﬁrmed the main result of our main study: that individuals prefer to punish
actions rather than omissions. However, as in Study 1, we also found a substantial amount
7Results are broadly similar if we use the alternative, absolute measure of punishment asymmetry, whereby
proposed punishment of omissions is subtracted from proposed punishment of actions: correlations are
positive, but modest, and not statistically signiﬁcant.
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Figure 6: Distribution of within-subject differences in judgments of causal responsibility
for harmful acts and omissions. Responses range from –6 (maximal asymmetry favouring
omission causation) to +6 (maximal asymmetry favouring action causation).
Table 5: Correlations of group level asymmetries in punishment proposals, causal judgment, and fairness attitudes regarding punishment (n = 23 groups; Kendall’s tau; p-values
in parentheses).

Punishment
Causal judgment

Causal judgment

Fairness

0.21 (0.26)
–

0.19 (0.29)
0.05 (0.80)

of punishment of omitters. Compared to our ﬁrst Study, this experiment demonstrated this
result in a setting where the causal roles of actions and omissions were symmetric.
This study also directly asked subjects about their perception of the causal role of
acts and omissions in the relevant scenario. There was no signiﬁcant correlation between
perceiving acts to be more causal and punishing acts more than omissions.
Our failure to ﬁnd a signiﬁcant association between causal perception and punishment
behavior may of course be due to a lack of power, but is prima facie at odds with several
ﬁndings which suggest that the preference to commit harm by omission is at least partly
explained by diﬀerences in causal perception of acts versus omissions (Baron & Ritov, 2009;
Cushman & Young, 2011; Greene et al., 2009). There are several possible explanations
for why we failed to ﬁnd this eﬀect. We used a question about causal responsibility that
was relatively broad and inclusive in the causal language used (roughly: do you agree that
the pushing/non-pushing was “a cause of the outcome” [emphasis added]), and this may
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have therefore prompted subjects to consider counterfactual notions of causation which are
notoriously inclusive (Lewis, 2000, pp. 195–197), rather than notions of “direct” versus
“indirect” causation, which have been argued to be important in this regard (Baron & Ritov,
2009). It is also possible that our ﬁndings diverge because our principal measure is how
subjects punish acts versus omissions, rather than on the actual performance of act versus
omission, but we ﬁnd it unlikely that this diﬀerence explains the divergence.

4 General Discussion
Across a total of four experiments (two of which are reported in the supplementary materials)
involving ﬁve treatments and 580 subjects in 123 groups of varying size, we observed a
widespread tendency for subjects to punish harmful acts more than harmful omissions. The
economic games across these studies shared a basic structure. Some players were given
an opportunity to take valuable resources from another player, other players were given an
opportunity to rectify the victim’s losses, and other players made decisions about whether to
punish those who took resources (“actors”), those who failed to rectify victims (“omitters”),
or both. In each study subjects were on average signiﬁcantly more likely to punish actors
than omitters, and they punished actors more harshly.
One motivation for our studies was to assess whether the act–omission bias in punishment reﬂects a choice to implement a relatively eﬃcient punishment strategy. In typical
settings, a single actor suﬃces to cause a bad outcome (e.g., litter being on the ground) but
many people could potentially rectify this bad outcome. There is therefore an asymmetry
between the number of people that you would need to punish if you enforced a prohibition
on harmful action versus the number of people you would need to punish if you enforced
an obligation to rectify harm. Other things being equal, it should thus be more eﬃcient
to punish actions rather than omissions in typical settings. Our experiment was designed
to manipulate the typical situation, to assess whether the act–omission bias in punishment
reﬂects a strategic choice to implement an eﬃcient punishment strategy.
Our studies provided only limited support for the eﬃciency hypothesis. In Study 1,
we manipulated that asymmetry by varying the number of actors and omitters causally
implicated in causing harm. One condition had a single potential actor and two potential
omitters. In this case the bad outcome would occur if the actor pushed the red button and
both omitters failed to push the green button. Another condition ﬂipped this around: there
were two potential actors and one potential omitter. In this case, the bad outcome would
occur if both actors pushed the red button and the omitters failed to push the green button.
In this second condition, it is more eﬃcient to punish the omitter than the actors. If agents
adopted the strategy of punishing the smallest group of individuals necessary to deter the
loss of public goods, then they would always have punished the solely responsible category.
There was some evidence that the eﬃciency makes a modest diﬀerence, but the magnitude
of this eﬀect was substantially smaller than the eﬀect of the act/omission distinction.
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Our eﬃciency hypothesis was motivated by the thought that punishment of actions is less
burdensome than punishment of omissions, because there will typically be fewer culpable
actors than omitters to punish. Another way in which punishment of omissions is more
burdensome than punishment of actions is that omissions tend to leave no physical traces of
having occurred, hence it is diﬃcult to have conclusive evidence that an individual culpably
omitted to do something. Consider an air traﬃc controller who fails to notify a pilot of an
imminent collision. Did the air traﬃc controller have the opportunity to notify the pilot, or
was she unconscious at the time? There is unlikely to be any physical trace that would verify
either hypothesis. By contrast, an air traﬃc controller who deliberately gave a misleading
message that no collision was imminent (performed a culpable action) will leave a trace
on the aircraft’s voice recorder. DeScioli and colleagues (DeScioli, Bruening, et al., 2011)
argue that this diﬀerence leads – in normal circumstances – to a preference to condemn
harmful actions rather than harmful omissions. This in turn leads to a strategic preference
on the part of individuals who wish to perform self-serving, harmful behaviors to do so by
omission rather than commission (DeScioli, Christner & Kurzban, 2011). But they ﬁnd that
these omission eﬀects – in punishment and in harmful choices – are reduced substantially
when the evidential asymmetry is removed: omissions that leave a physical trace of having
occurred are condemned more than omissions which come about from mere failure to act
in time, and this holds even when controlling for equivalent, malevolent intentions in the
two cases. In our setting, there was arguably no evidential asymmetry between acts and
omissions: it was transparent to subjects when harmful omissions occurred, and omissions
could not occur through a subject simply failing to make a decision in time. The account of
DeScioli and colleagues, however, may contribute to explaining the smaller than expected
magnitude of the omission eﬀect that we observed.
A second motivation for our studies was to investigate whether the asymmetry of
punishment behavior is likely the result of diﬀerences in normative attitudes towards acts and
omissions. In both our studies, there was signiﬁcant heterogeneity in subjects’ perceptions
of the relative fairness of punishing acts versus omissions. A substantial proportion of our
subjects thought it equally fair to punish omissions and actions, while roughly half thought
it more fair to punish acts than omissions. This heterogeneity in judgments of fairness
turned out to be a signiﬁcant predictor of the choice of punishment policy, which is at least
consistent with the hypothesis that the act–omission bias is explained by an asymmetry in
judgments of fairness.
An alternative hypothesis is that subjects punish actions more than omissions because
they perceive actions as more causally responsible for the eventual harms. We examined
this hypothesis in Study 2, where a substantial fraction of subjects reported in a postexperimental survey that they believe pressing the red button was more causally responsible
for the bad outcome than refraining from pressing the green button. We could not draw
any strong conclusions in this regard – there was no signiﬁcant association between causal
judgment asymmetry and punishment asymmetry.
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One limitation of our design is that, although we made signiﬁcant eﬀorts to make acts
and omissions causally equivalent in their contributions to the harm, in all our treatments,
the harmful acts were temporally prior to the harmful omissions. This may have inﬂuenced
perception of the causal role of the respective acts and omissions. In some legal doctrines
regarding causation, for instance, an intervening action can render earlier events non-causal,
but intervening omissions tend not to be regarded in this way (Moore, 2019). If this sort
of consideration were relevant here, then in an experiment in which harmful omissions
(like a failure to vaccinate) precede harmful actions, we might expect a stronger asymmetry
of causal perception, and perhaps also a stronger asymmetry of punishment. But this
speculation remains to be tested.
Although we found a robust tendency to punish acts more than omissions, we were
surprised by the large proportion of subjects who chose to punish both acts and omissions.
In both Studies 1 and 2, as well as the two additional studies reported in the supplemental
materials, many subjects punished those who failed to exhibit beneﬁcence, i.e., positive
acts of kindness or generosity. The omitters had a chance to restore funds to a victim, and
if they fail to do so, many subjects apparently thought it appropriate to punish them. This
was perhaps the most interesting ﬁnding from our studies. It runs against the moral view
suggested by Adam Smith, who asserts the following proposition:
Beneﬁcence is always free, it cannot be extorted by force, the mere want of it
exposes to no punishment; because the mere want of beneﬁcence tends to do
no real positive evil.
A recent paper by Vernon Smith and Bart Wilson (2017) presents empirical evidence in
support of Smith’s proposition in the context of trust games. Our results run counter to this
claim in the context of social dilemmas. Indeed, among those who punished, a majority of
them punished individuals who failed to exhibit beneﬁcence.
What makes these results particularly surprising is that most of the explicit laws and
moral rules we have are act-based (Ritov & Baron, 1990, 1999). It’s against the law to steal,
but not against the law to refrain from rectifying the victim of theft. By and large, littering
is proscribed, but not failing to pick up litter. (“Bad Samaritan” laws do exist in some
jurisdictions, but are a relative rarity (Robinson & Darley, 1995 chap. 2).) One is required
to keep one’s promises, but not to ensure that others keep their promises. Our results suggest
that the prevalence of act-based rules is not due to some widespread psychological aversion
at punishing those who fail to be beneﬁcent. This accords with the suggestion due to
Willemsen and Reuter (2016) that an act–omission bias only emerges when there is a clear
norm that proscribes actions in particular. In our case – a relatively novel, artiﬁcial game
in a laboratory setting – it is perhaps unsurprising that there may be some disagreement
among subjects as to the relevant norms.
Another factor that may explain the high rate of punishment of omissions is that our
paradigm may have created a social role of responsibility for the bystander. There is
evidence that, at least in some cultures (Baron & Miller, 2000), social roles of responsibility
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reduce the act/omission asymmetry, generating similar levels of condemnation for harms by
omission or commission (Haidt & Baron, 1996). This mechanism, if present, is presumably
compatible with a norm-based account of the asymmetry, since social roles are in large part
deﬁned by the norms that are associated with those roles.
Although we interpret our results as supporting a norm-based account, it should be
emphasized that we did not directly manipulate the beliefs of the subjects about the fairness
of punishing omissions and thus cannot draw any strong causal inferences. We welcome
future research to address this limitation, though we note there is a potential diﬃculty in
manipulating beliefs about what is morally required, given these are beliefs which are –
unlike social norms – theorized as relatively insensitive to social cues (Bicchieri, 2005).
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